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NOTES
BROKERS-PLEDGE-S---REIIYPOTIECATION OF STOcK-DEFENSE
TO TIHE ACTION-A somewhat striking decision has been recently
handed down by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Sproul v.
Sloan,, involving the rights of a pledgee convertor of stocks. The
broker was to purchase the stock and carry it on a margin. As the
stock was purchased from time to time he mingled it with other
stock, all of which he rehypothecated for an indebtedness of his
own, without knowledge or authority of the customer. The stock
depreciated heavily and the customer, upon learning of the con-
version, refused the tender of it, and the demand for the payment
of the debt, or balance due the broker. The stock was then sold
and the proceeds credited to the customer, and an action brought
for the alleged balance. It was ruled that inasmuch as the broker had
converted to his own use the stock purchased for the customer (de-
fendant) by hypothecating it for his own indebtedness, he had
24i Pa. 284 (913) ; 88 AtI. Rep. Soi.
(127)
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broken his contract and the tender of the stock before the sale was
immaterial, since he was in no position to demand performance by
the customer. As soon as the customer had learned of the con-
version, he, as was his right, repudiated the contract. The only
safe rule is that the broker pledges the stock at his peril.
The effect of this decision is that where a pledgee converts the
subject matter of the pledge he thereby presents to the pledgor a total
defense to any action upon the contract of pledge or upon the prin-
cipal indebtedness secured by it, and has apparently, at the option
of the pledgor, extinguished all his own rights under it. While in
this particular case, in view of the insolvency of the pledgee, a
somewhat summary justice to the pledgor lends color to the deci-
sion,2 yet upon a consideration of the relation of the parties as de-
fined at the common law generally,2 and as defined in Pennsylvania
in actions4 correlative to that of the principal case, 'iz., pledgor
against pledgee, we find that a conversion of the pledge has not been
recognized as a defense to, nor as destructive of the obligation, but
is admitted as a basis of equitable counterclaim, or by way of re-
coupment of damages.
The Court of Appeals of New York, in treating -the question
presented upon exactly the same facts as those of the principal case,
ruled5 that the pledgee had a right of recovery for the credit extended
but was liable for the damages sustained by the customer by reason
of the subsequent conversion; that the rehypothecation and resulting
sale of the stock did not constitute a failure to perform a condition
precedent, but established a breach of a condition subsequent to the
purchase. This is an express recignition and enforcement of the
principal indebtedness despite a conversion of the subject of the
pledge.
In Johnson v. Stear,4 an action by the pledgor against the
pledgee for conversion, the English court ruled that in estimating
damages the interest of the pledgee in the security at the time of
the conversion is to be taken into consideration, because "the con-
tract creates an interest and a right of property in the goods which is
2 And even this phase of decision loses strength in view of the succeeding
rights of the insolvent's assignees.
OJohnson v. Stear, io Jur. N. S. 99 (Eng. 1864); Donald v. Suckling,
L R. x Q. B. 585. 6og (Eng. 1866); Halliday v. Holgate, L R. 3 Exch. 299
(Eng. 1868); 21 Amer. Law Reg. 454; Jones on Collateral Securities, §§42o
et seq.; Boone, ' Mortgiges," §3o6; Paine, "Bailments," 123; Story, Bail-
ments, §315.
'4WVork v. Bennett, 7o Pa. 484 (1870); Rolan v. Bank, 135 Pa. 598 (z890);
and compare Stuart v. Bigler, 98 Pa. 8o (r88I) and Thompson v. Patrick, 4
Watts, 414 (Pa. 1835). which are easily reconcilable with the rule contrary
to the principal case.
*Capron v. Thompson, 86 N. Y. 418 (x88x), flatly contra to Sloan v.
Sproul.
'10 Jur. N. S. 99 (Eng. 2864).
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more than a mere lien; and the wrongful act of the pledgee does
not annihilate the contract between the parties nor the interest of
the pawnee in the goods undor that contract." This case, repeatedly
affirmed in England and accorded almost universal approval in
American jurisdictions, is fundamentally definitive of the relation
of the parties to, and their rights under a contract of pledge, which
arises from an obligation (a) on the part of the pledgor to pay a
stated indebtedness to the pledgee, to secure the payment of which
he places certain property in the hands of the pledgee, who (b)
obligates himself either to rcturn the property upon satisfaction of
the obligation from other funds of the pledgor, or on sale of the
pledge and satisfaction from the proceeds thereof, to return the
surllus.7  The original indebtedness or obligation is superior to
and independent of the contract of pledge, the latter being col-
lateral. It is difficult to see wherein a breach of the collateral con-
tract can affect the validity of the principal obligation, other than
by way of an equitable counterclaim or cross action, or by re-
coupment of damages. The original obligation remains, subject to
adjustment upon respective claims of the parties, payable to the
pledgee," who has never released his chose in action by any method
known to the law of contracts. That obligation continues and is
binding independently of the status of the collateral security. The
pledgee may upon default of the pledgor, elect to proceed personally
against him for his debt, without a sale of the security,9 and obtain
a judgment without in any wise affecting his lien.'0 This being
true there is slight ground for the contention that a breach of the
collateral contract of pledge, or a tort upon the subject matter
of the pledge, constitutes a total defense to an action upon the
principal obligation.
Nor does there appear to be any tenable reason to support the
rule from the defendant's point of view. The transaction opens
with an obligation on his part to pay another, and to secure thi
performance of that obligation he agrees to give that other pos-
session of property in pledge. As already pointed out the original
obligation is unaffected. Should the debtor, now pledgor, in con-
sequence of any default or conversion by the pledgee, recover the
value of the pledge, still the debt remains and is recoverable, unless
See cases and text writers referred to in notes 3 and 4 supra.
'Johnson v. Stear, supra. n. 3; Halliday v. Holgate, supra, n. 3; Work v.
Bennett, supra, n. 4; Boone, Mortgages, §§3o7, 308.
'Granite Bank v. Richardson. 7 Met. 407 (Mass. 1844), where the pledge
after maturity and during the suit had become worthless; Ward v. Morgan, s
Sneed, 79 (Tenn. 1857) ; Elder v. Rouse, i5 Wend. 218 (N. Y. 1836); South
Sea Co. v. Duncombe, 2 Strange, gig (Eng. 1714)-
"Jones v. Scott, io Kan. 33 (1872) ; Archbald v. Argall, 53 Ill. 307
(187o). But contra, as to retention of the lien only, Poole v. Symonds, r
N. H. 289 (1x88).
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in such prior action it has been deducted." Although the use of
the pledge has been tortious, the pledge is answerable but only in
an action12 (including, of course, cross action and recoupmentl..
The damages go only to the extent of the injury to the pledgor's
rights in the pledge subject to the pledgee's special property at the
time of the conversion. 3 So, if the pledgor desires to avail him-
self, -via defense, of the advantage of the pledgee's tort or default,
he is limited to his actual loss; if he desires to recover for the con-
version he departs from the contract relation, and is thereby put to
separate action."4
Nor can the tort of the pledgee be said to be a sufficient justifica-
tion for depriving the pledgor or where he is insolvent, his assignee
of the rights accruing under the principal obligation. " The mere
fact that the contract has proved to be a poor bargain from the
debtor's point of view, has never operated in the eyes of the law
to relieve him from performance.
Nor is there anything favorable to the rule to be gathered from
the theory that a pledgee is a trustee of the pledge. That theory,
while apparently sufficient to define the status of the pledgee with
regard to the property,' is not tenable in that it fails to account for
and include the larger rights and liabilities of the parties with regard
to the principal obligation or indebtedness.
J.C.A.
CONTRACTS IN RESTRAINT oF TRADE-LAI1OR UNIONs-The hat
manufacturers of a certain town and vicinity, acting in concert,
entered into an agreement with a labor union not to employ any but
union labor. The plaintiff, being dropped from the rolls of the
local union, was discharged from the employment of one of the
manufacturers in pursuance of the agreement, at the instigation of
the defendants. The court held that the agreement was contrary
to public policy where it embraced an entire industry of any con-
siderable proportion in the community, so. that it would operate
generally in that community to prevent or to seriously deter crafts-
men from working at their trade under favorable conditions without
11 Ratcliff v. Davis. Yelv. 179 (abt. i6oo); Bac. Abridg. "Bailment," B.
The rule obtains in both common and civil law, Story on Bailments, §§315, 316.
'Thompson v. Patrick, supra, n. 4, and ruling further that after a con-
version by the pledgee, should the pledgor surreptitiously get possession of
the pledge, he cannot hold it as against the pledgee, or his assignees.
'Johnson v. Stear, supra, n. 3.
"'Stearns v. Marsh, 4 Denio. 227 (N. Y. 1847); Bulkley v. Welsh, 3i
Conn. 339 (1863).
" judgments upon contracts. it is submitted, are by policy of the common
law remedial, not punitive.
"'Jones on Collat. Security. 393; Felton v. Brooks, 4 Cush. 2o3 (Mass.
1849) ; McCrea v. Yule, 68 N. J. L 465 (ixoz).
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joining a union; hence the agreement was no justification to the
defendants for inducing the plaintiff's discharge.'
The cases as to liablity for causing the discharge of an em-
ployee divide themselves into two classes: (a) those cases where
the discharge is procured by means of threats, coercion, etc.;2 and
(b) those where the discharge is the result of an agreement pre-
viously entered into. Only the cases falling within the second class,
of which the principal case is one, will be treated in this note.
Contracts between an employer or an association of employers
and a labor union, providing for the employment of members of
the union only, are of very recent origin, and the decisions in respect
to their validity few in number and not altogether harmonious.
In the earliest case on the questions it was held that such a
contract was no defense for representatives of the union in an
action brought against them individually by a non-union man for
damages for procuring his discharge in accordance with the "closed
shop" agreement because the contract was against public policy and
void. Here the agreement was between the union and an association
of employers. In the next case, 4 on substantially the same facts, the
court held the contract to be consonant with public policy, and valid.
The court says that Curran v. Galen' "stands unaffected as authority"
and bases its decision on the distinction that in Curran v. Galen there
was an association of employers, while in Jacobs v. Cohen6 there
was but a single employer in the agreement; arguing that if the
agreement was not such as embraced an entire industry or if it did
not operate generally in the community to prevent such craftsmen
from obtaining any employment then it is lawful and not void as
against public policy. These two cases are followed in Mills v.
United States Printing Co! and in McCord v. Thompson-Starrett
Co.8 and would seem to crystallize the New York law into two rules:
(a) a contract, between an association of all (or practically all)
the employers of labor engaged in the same line of business in a
single community, by which it is agreed that the employees of the
individuals composing the association shall be exclusively members
of the union, is against public policy and void, but (b) that a con-
' Connors v. Connolly et al., 86 Atl. Rep. 60o (Conn. 1913).
' This class of cases is treated very exhaustively by Prof. Jeremiah
Smith. of the Harvard Law School, in 2o HARVARD LAw REVIEW, 253, 345,
428 (1907). See also an article by Dr. William Draper Lewis, Dean of the
Law School of the University of Pennsylvania, in iS HARVARD LAw REVIEw,
444 (19oS).
a Curran v. Galen, 152 N. Y. 33 (1897).
"Jacobs v. Cohen, 183 N. Y. 207 (i9o).
'Supra, n. 3.
'Supra, n. 4.
99 N. Y. App. Div. 6oS (0o4).
i319 N. Y. App. Div. 130 (i9o8).
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tract, between an individual employer and a labor union, by which
the employer binds himself to employ and retain in his employ only
workmen who are members of the union and only such members
as are in good standing, is not against public policy and is valid.
As is seen from the principal case, Connecticut apparently has
adopted these rules; or it might be more accurate to say it has
adopted the first of these rules, since the facts of the case fall within
that rule. Yet from the language and the spirit of the decision it
is gathered, that it would adopt the second rule if facts were pre-
sented to them which demanded a decision on this point.
In Brennan v. United Hatters of North America," the New
Jersey Courts made no adjudication in respect to such a contract, it
being unnecessary to the decision in the case but the substance of
the decision in Curran v. Galen0 and Jacobs v. Cohen,11 was stated
and it was 'Said: "Whether these decisions are consistent with each
other is a question that may require consideration at a future time."
In Curran v. Galen, the court bases its opinion on the funda-
mental principle that while it is perfectly lawful to combine for
such legitimate purposes as to obtain an advance in the rate of
compensation, or to maintain such rate, or to better working condi-
tions; yet such combinations cease to be lawful when they are so
extended in their operation as either to intend, or to accomplish, in-
jury to others. When the operations of an organization are such as
to promote the common good of its members, they are legitimate
instrumentalities, but when they militate against the general public
interest by directing their powers toward the repression of indi-
vidual freedom they cannot be justified. The justification of this
latter class of operations would conflict with that principle of public
policy which prohibits monopolies and exclusive privileges. In
Jacobs v. Cohen the court nullifies to a large extent the fundamental
principle laid down in Curran v. Galen and seems to, in a measure at
least, shift the grounds of the decision. It is submitted that, while
the distinction on the facts between the two cases is perfectly evi-
dent, yet the reasoning of the court as to why a different legal con-
clusion should result is not clear or convincing. A vigorous dissent-
ing opinion was handed down by two members of the court.
The Supreme Court of Massachusetts in Berry v. Donovan"2 in
an elaborate opinion expressly approved Curran v. Galen, and in
adopting the principles there expressed elaborated on them. In the
course of the opinion it was pointed out that contracts, the object
of which is to compel a workman to join a union, cannot be justi-
fied as legitimate competition between workmen, but on the other
hand tend to prevent such competition and to foster monopoly. It
"73 N. I. L 729, 65 Ad. Rep. i65 (9o6).
152 N. Y. 33 (1897)j.
u183 N. Y. 2o7 (igos).
32 x88 Mass. 353, 74 N. E. Rep. 6o3 (i905).
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is no legal objection to- ction whose-direct effect is helpful to one
of the parties in the struggle, that it is aiso directly detrimental to
the other. But when action is directed against the other, primarily
for the purpose of doing him harm and thus compelling him to
yield to the demand of the actor, and this action does not directly
affect the property, or business or status of the actor, the case is
different, even if the actor expects to dcrive a remote or indirect
benefit from the act. The gain which a labor union may expect to
derive from inducing others to join it, is not an improvement to be
obtained directly in the conditions under which the men are working,
but only addcd strength for such contests with employers as may
arise in the future. An object of this kind is too remote to be
considered a benefit in business, such as to justify the infliction of
injury upon a third person for the purpose of obtaining it.
C. MCA. S.
CORPORATIONS--STOCHOLDERS' LIABILITY FOR UNPAID SUB-
SCIPTONS-It is well settled that upon the insolvency of a cor-
poration, its creditors may, in a proper proceeding in equity, reach
and apply, to the payment of their claims, any unpaid balances to the
subscription of the capital stock of the corporation.' A recent Cali-
fornia decision 2 has once more stated this proposition.
Although this principle can be said to be practically universal,
the American courts are not, however, in accord as to the doctrine
or theory to be applied in deciding cases arising under it. Three
important doctrines, generally followed by the different jurisdictions,
have thus far been brought forward by the Federal, Minnesota4
and Missouri' courts, respectively.
The Federal courts apply in these cases the so-called Trust-
Fund Theory, based on a dictum of Judge Story in Wood v.
Dummer,4 to the effect that the capital stock of a corporation consti-
tutes a "trust-fund" for the payment of corporate debts. Under
this doctrine, no part of the capital of the corporation can be law-
' Sawyer v. Hoag, 17 Wall. 61o (U. S. r873) ; Upton v. Tribilcock, 9z
U. S. 45 (1875); Hospes v. Manufacturing Co., 48 Minn. 174 (i889); 4
Thompson on Corporations (2nd Ed.), §4935.
'Herron Co. v. Shaw, 133 Pac. Rep. 488 (Cal. 1913).
Sawyer v. Hoag, supra, n. I.
'Hospes v. Manufacturing Co., supra, n. z.
'Chrisman-Sawyer Banking Co. v. Wool Manufacturing Co., 168 Mo.
634 (1902).
3 Mason's Reports, 308 (U. S. 7824). In this case a bank had divided
its capital stock as dividends among its stockholders without paying its
creditors, the bank note holders. The creditors brought a bill against the
stockholders for the payment of their notes. Judge Story inter alia said,
"The capital stock of banks is to be deemed a pledge or trust fund for the
payment of the debts contracted by the bank." This statement was unneces-
sary, as the bank's acts were fraudulent and void as against its creditors.
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fully withdrawn by the stockholders if there are any outstanding
corporate obligations to the payment of which it should be ap-
plied. If, therefore, any portion of the capital stock for which a
stockholder has subscribed has not been paid, such balance remains
in the hands of the stockholder impressed with a trust in favor of
the corporate creditors; and if the assets are insufficient to discharge
the corporate obligations, the creditors may in equity subject the
unpaid balance to the payment of their claims.7 The trust-fund
doctrine is not as unqualified as its mere statement would cause one
to conclude. For the Federal courts,'seeing that the practical ap-
plication of the doctrine as usually stated would be ruinous to, and
destructive of, the business management of corporations, have
limited its application, so that it does not really apply until the
insolvency of the corporation.$ This doctrine is, however, incon-
sistent in many of the decisions based under it; for example, that
a creditor who has contracted his debt with the corporation prior to
the subscription of the stockholder whom he is serving cannot re-
cover, as he did not rely on such subscription.' It is submitted that if
the capital stock and unpaid subscriptions, which are a part of the
capital, are a trust fund, the fact that one is a prior creditor should
make no difference in his right against unpaid stockholders.
The Minnesota courts ° have set forth a doctrine which, though
based in a way on the trust-fund theory, is nevertheless much more
consistent in its decisions. This doctrine, often called the Deceit
Doctrine, places the recovery of unpaid subscriptions by creditors
on the ground of fraud or deceit practised on the creditors by the
misrepresentation of the stockholders in stating the amount of capi-
tal to be greater than it really is. Under this theory, any scheme
or arrangement by which stockholders may avoid full payment of
the subscription is a fraud on those creditors who rely on full
payment; and these creditors may recover on the ground of this
fraud. If, therefore, a creditor, whose debt was contracted prior
to the stockholder's subscription, sues for an unpaid balance, he
cannot recover; he has not relied on any misrepresentation by the
stockholder.11 Likewise, if the creditor knows of the arrangement
by which stock is issued fully paid, though in fact only a part of
the subscription is paid, he cannot recover since there was no reliance
on his part nor fraud practised on him.'
2
126 Am. and Eng. Encyc. of Law (2nd Ed.), .oo7 et seq.
'Thompson on Corporations (2nd Ed.), §3418; Graham v. La Crosse Co.,
102 U. S. 148 (1880).
'.Marion Trust Co. v. Blish, z7o Ind. 686 (19o8); 4 Thompson on Cor-
porations (2nd Ed.), §5o2I.
"Hospes Y. Manufacturing Co., supra. n. i; National Bank v. Mining
Co., 42 Minn. 327, I89o.
" National Bank v. Mining Co., supra, n. io.
'2 Bent v. Underwood, 156 Ind. 516 (igo); Callanan v. Windsor, 78
Iowa, 193 (1889); Coit v. North Carolina Co., 14 Fed. 12 (1882): contra
Sprague v. Bank, 172 111. 149 (1898) ; Gillett v. Chicago Co., 23o Ill. 373 (1907).
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The ,Missouri courts" have gone a step further and have held
that all corporate creditors, without regard to whether their debts
were contracted previous or subsequent to the subscription, have a
right to apply unpaid subs'riptions to the payment of their debts,
unless they choose to waive this right. It is submitted that this
should be the rule governing a stockholder's liability for unpaid
subscriptions, as it conforms "to the demands of business integrity
and honesty and is the logical sequence of the voluntary act of the
stockholder flowing from his subscription."** The theory of "hold-
ing out" or reliance, set forth in the Deceit Theory as the foundation
of the stockholder's liability, is not absolutely true, inasmuch as
when one becomes a creditor of a corporation there is really no
"holding out" by existing stockholders as opposed to subsequent
stockholders as far as he is concerned. lie relies entirely on the
capital stock of the corporation, whether subscribed previous or
subsequent to his contract with the corporation.
Frequently, charters of corporations provide that the subscrip-
tion may be paid in property, real and personal." In such cases,
the question often arises as to whether there has been an over-
valuation of the property, and the courts have settled upon certain
rules in deciding these cases. The Federal courts hold that fraud
will not be presumed; but if actually proved, it will vitiate the trans-
action to the extent of compelling the stockholders to pay the
difference between the par value of the stock and the actual value
of the property."' Gross overvaluation is strong and almost con-
clusive evidence of fraud, according to the degree of overvaluation.
The Minnesota courts are in accord." The New York courts will
rescind the contract of subscription on the ground of fraud but will
not imply a new contract by which the stockholders shall pay the
difference between the par value of the stock and the actual value
of the property."'
N.I.S.G.
PATENTS-INVENTION-DOUBLE UsE-The dividing line be-
tween a new use involving invention and a mere double use which
is not patentable, is one often very difficult to draw, and will de-
pend entirely on the facts of the particular case. An instance of a
mere double use is furnished by the recent case of Weir FrOg Co. v.
Chrisman-Sawyer Banking Co. v. Wool Manufacturing Co., supra, n. 5.
"4Chrisman-Sawyer Banking Co. Y. Wool Manufacturing Co.. supra, n. S.
" Coit v. North Carolina Co., supra, n. 12.
"Taylor v. Cummings, 127 Fed. To8 (1903); Taylor v. Walker, 117 Fed.
737 (1o92) : Coit v. North Carolina Co., supra, n. T2.
"'Hastings Co. v. Iron Range Co., 65 Minn. 28 (1896); see 4 Thompson
on Corporations (2nd Ed.). §§3975-93." Southwork v. Morgan, 2os N. Y. 293 (1912).
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Porter2 In this case a patent for a semi-automatic derailing
switch was held void for lack of invention. The switch was set
so as to divert the car from the main track and was held in that
position by means of a weight, thereby requiring positive interven-
tion to throw it into its alternative position and causing it to return
to the original position when the force was removed. The special
utility of the device was in reference to crossings of steam railroads
by electric cars. By placing the operating lever at the crossing, or
danger point, the conductor of an approaching car, will be com-
pelled to go forward to that point, and hold the switch so that the
car can pass and in so doing he gets a view of the other track.
That a patentee is entitled to every use of which his inventioni
is susceptible, is fundamental, whether such use be known or un-
known to him.2 But the person who has taken his device and by
improvements thereon, even though slight, has adapted it to a dif-
ferent industry, may thus draw to himself the quality of inventor.'
For it often requires as much intuitive genius to grasp the idea that
a device heretofore used in one art, may be made available in
another, as would be necessary to create the device de novo. And
this is none the less true if, after the thing has been done, it ap-
pears to the ordinary mind so simple as to excite wonder that it
was not thought of before. As the cases of necessity go entirely
upon the particular facts, it is almost impossible to lay down any
hard and fast rules for determining the exact point where invention
begins. But the underlying principle is the same in all cases, and is
well stated in Potts v. Creager.' The court said:
"As a result of the authorities it may be said that if the new
use be so nearly analogous to the former one, that the appli-
cability of the device to its new use would occur to a person of
ordinary mechanical skill, it is only a case of double use; but
if the relations between them be remote and especially if the
use of the old device produce a new result it may at least in-
volve invention."
In a doubtful case the fact that a subject of a patent has gone
into general use and has displaced other processes or things, which
had previously been employed for analogous uses, may be sufficient
to turn the scale in favor of the existence of invention;' so also
a long unsatisfied prior demand.
In the principal case, switches and switch points were old.
',o6 Fed. Rep. 670 (1913).
'Tucker v. Spalding, 13 Wall. 453 (U. S. 1871); Brown v. Piper, 91
U. S. 37 (x875); Roberts v. Ryer, 91 U. S. 15o (1875); Penna. Co. v.
Locomotive Co., io U. S. 49o (1883).
'Potts v. Creager, i55 U. S. 597 (1894).
'Ante n. 3.
'Smith v. Dental Vulcanite Co., 93 U. S. 495 (1876).
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Operating them by rods or cables running to a distant point was old.
The use of a spring or weiglht to hold the switch point normally in
one of its two alternative positions, so that it would always be in that
position except while temporary force held it in another position,
was old. And it was old to operate this particular kind of a switch
from a distance. These features or their equivalents were all pres-
ent in a patent granted to one Martel.G The only difference in
Martel's device was that in his patent the switch was used to keep
the main track open, while in the Porter patent it was to keep the
main track closed. The court has taken the view that "main track,"
and switch track are mere arbitrary names, and really mechanically
identical, for what is a switch to-day may become the main line
to-morrow, because of a blockade, or because the superintendent
changes his mind. If this be true the Porter patent is clearly only
an instance of a double use, namely, keeping the main track closed
instead of open. It is suggested, however, that in this case, the
words "main track," have a distinct and more particular meaning,
in that they refer to the only track which crosses the danger point
and leads to the car's destination.
It was further contended that the increased safety derived from
requiring the switch to be operated at the danger point was such
a new result as to amount to invention. At first glance this might
seem to be the case. But upon closer inspection it is clear that there
is no actual new result produced; merely a new utilization of an
old result. It amounts to no more than an idea for a wider use of
an old device without any new mechanical embodiment. And this
as pointed out by Judge Grosscup in Voightnan v. PerkinsonT is not
patentable. He said:
"Concept alone is not patentable. Concept must be accom-
panied by mechanical embodiment and as the law now stands
mechanical embodiment, to make the invention patentable must
itself be emancipated. . . . Now in Voightman's patent
every mechanical element is found to have pre-existed . ..
Voightman possibly has pointed out to the world a wider use
of the pre-existing art than was before known. But the dis-
covery of an enlarged use is not of itself patentable invention."
T.S.P.
WILLs-THE RULE ix SHELLEYS CASE-In a recent case it
was held by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania that, where the
testator devised his real estate to his daughter for life and after
her death to descend to and become vested in the children of the
• No. 243,933 (1881).
'138 Fed. Rep. 86 (ixo5).
'Lauer v. Hoffman, z4t Pa. 3x5 (1913).
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said daughter, should she have any, in fee simple, and in default of
such children, then to such person or persons as she may by her
last will and testament direct; and then followed by a declaration
that in no event whatever shall the fee simple to the said real estate
vest in the daughter during her lifetime, the rule in Shelley's case
applied and the daughter took a fee simple.
A statement of the rule is as follows: "Wherever the ancestor
takes an estate of freehold, and an immediate remainder is thereon
limited in the same conveyance to his heirs, or heirs in tail, such
remainder is immediately executed in possession in the ancestor so
taking the freehold, and therefore is not contingent or in abeyance."
The rule has no place in the interpretation of a will, and takes effect
only when the interpretation has been first ascertained by the ap-
plication of settled rules of construction. In determining whether
the rule is applicable the test is how the donees in remainder are
to take. If as purchasers under the donor, then the particular estate
is limited by the literal words of the deed and the rule in Shelly's
case, has no application. But if the remaindermen are to take as
heirs to the donee of the particular estate, then what has been called
the superior intent, operates and the first donee takes a fee.4
The great point made against-the rule is that it disregards the
intention of the author of the instrument. In our principal case,, in
the dissenting opinion it was said that the majority of the court
ignored the cardinal rule, time and again announced in all jurisdic-
tions, that a will shall be construed from all four corners and that
all four parts of it shall be made to harmonize if possible. The
rule in Shelley's case, however, is not really an exception to the
rule that the intention of the testator must guide in interpreting
a will, but only sacrifices a particular to a general intent.* Sir
William Blackstone, in his famous argument in Perrin v. Blake,'
pointed out that the true question of intent should turn not upon
the quantity of the estate intended to be given to the first devisee,
but upon the nature of the estate intended to be given to the heirs.$
The testator either intends that the estate shall go to the whole
line of life tenant's heirs, in succession from generation to genera-
tion, in the course marked out by the law of descent; or he intends
that it shall go to a portion of those heirs in a course different from
that marked out by the law of descent. It is apparent both cannot be
carried out unless a new species of estate, unknown to the law, is
2Fearnes Cont. Rem. A&
•Yarnall's Appeal, 70 Pa. 335 (1872).
'Shapley v. Diehl, 2o3 Pa. 566 (igoz).
'Lauer v. Hoffman, jupra, n. I.
'Fuller v. Chamier, 12 Jur. N. S. 642 (Eng. i866).
ix W. B3. 672 (K. B. Eng. t769).
'6 Greenleaf's Cruise, Real Prop. 386. See for same proposition,
Deemer v. Kessinger, 2o6 Ill. 57 (i9o3).
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created. Therefore, one or the other must govern. If it is certain
that the heirs of the life t.znant are to take by descent, the only
method by which this can be accomplished is by vesting in the an-
cestor an estate capable of descending, or in other words a fee. This
is what the rule in Shelley's case does, and in giving the ancestor a
larger estate than the creator in terms said, the court is really carry-
ing out the testator's main thought. It is therefore inaccurate to
state that the rule destroys the intent.
Where the language used in the instrument brings the devise
within the operation of the rule, the words must be taken as they
stand, in their strict legal signification. The question is not, whether
the testator intended the rule should not operate, for that is not
subject to his power, but whether he used words synonymous with
heir or heirs of the body as the case may be. Since it is a sub-
stantive rule of property, and not of construction, no declaration,
however unequivocal, that the ancestor shall have an estate for life
only, will be operative; the particular intent thus clearly expressed
will be compelled to yield to the general intent expressed by the
creation of the estate.10 In its principle, declared one court,"' it is
very like the rule of the Statute of Uses and of our equity, that dis-
regards the mere form of a title to land, and even some of its minor
incidents, and treats it as being his to whom it substantially belongs
though the form and intention be otherwise.
In our principal case the majority of the court said that it is
clear that in giving the daughter the life estate, the testator intended
to make her a source of inheritable succession. They construed the
words "descend to" and "become vested in" as standing alone and
not controlled by the subsequent positive declarations that they shall
not be interpreted so as to create in the daughter a fee simple estate.
Much can be said for the argument that the testator meant just the
reverse, to wit, that the children should take the fee in their own
right, that his main thought was for them as a particular class who
were to take from his as purchaser. The rule in Shelley's case does
not operate when the limitation in remainder is to the "children" of
the life tenant. It is considered as a word of purchase, unless it
clearly appears to have been used in the sense of heirs, or heirs of
the body. 2 By his positive declaration coupled with the use of the
word "children," it might be argued, that the testator clearly showed
his intent that the words "shall descend to and become vested in"
'Simpson v. Reed, 2.a5 Pa. 53 (19o3).
"'Trumbull v. Trumbull, r49 Mass. 2oo (z889); Martling v. Martling,
55 N. J. Eq. 771 (1896); VanGruten v. Foxwell, 77 L T. (N. S.) x7o
(Eng. 1897).
' Price v. Taylor, 28 Pa. 95, [02 (1857).
'On the question whether the word "children" is a word of limitation
or word of purchase generally, see note to Wills v. Folta, 61 W. Va. 262,
12 1 H.. A. (N. S.) 283, 56 S. E. Rep. 473 (xgo7).
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should be construed to mean "shall descend from me and go to."' s
If the will is thus read, no violence is done to the words used, no
departure is made from the rule in Shelley's case, and the clear
intent of the testator is given effect. S.L. M.
LEGAL ETincs-The following questions were recently an-
swered by the New York Lawyers' Association Committee on Pro-
fessional Ethics:
QUESTION:
Is it proper for a young man of twenty-two, who at present is com-
pleting a three-year course at law school, and has worked for about two years
in a law office, but has not yet been admitted to practice, to open an office
at his place of residence and there do notarial work (he being a notary
public), draw various legal papers, manage estates, collect rents and do a
general real estate and insurance business?
Also state whether such a pursuit would in any way affect the standing
of such a person, when applying for admission to the bar, so that it might
give the Committee on Character cause for hesitating in their approval of
him?
ANsWER:
In the opinion of the Committee, lie should refrain from the business
of drawing legal papers. The giving of legal advice by notaries and others
who are not admitted to practice law is, in its opinion, dangerous to the
welfare of the community, because such persons have not demonstrated their
capacity by submitting to* examination lawfully established for practitioners
of law. The Committee is not aware of any reason why he should not
engage in the other employments mentioned to such extent as may not
interfere with the proper completion of his law course. The Committee can-
not assume to express any views for the Committee on Character.
QUESTION:
An individual engaged in the printing business, and making a specialty
of case and brief printing, presents the following question:
"In the opinion of the Committee of Professional Ethics is there impro-
priety in my advertising in connection with my business the following:
"First Class Briefs Written for the Profession by Able Lawyers.
Also Cases on Appeal Prepared."
and in my employing for my customers lawyers to write briefs and to
prepare cases on appeal, making arrangements with them for their compen-
sation by me out of the compensation received by me for the combined work
of furnishing to my customers cases on appeal and briefs written by my said
lax yers and printed for the use of my customers at my printing estab-
lishment?"
"Donovan v. Woodworth, 234 Pa. So (1912).
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ANSWER:
While this question appears to be propounded by one not a member of
the profession, yet since it involv:s questions of "proper professional con-
duct," the Committee expresses its opinion as follows:
The course of action suggested would in our opinion be improper for
the iollowing reasons:
i. A printer so advertising, even if he were not violating the letter of
Section 270 of the Penal Law. which makes it unlawful for a person who has
not been duly admitted to the bar to practice law, would certainly be acting
contrary to the spirit of that provision.
2. Section 280 of the Penal Law makes it unlawful for a corporation to
furnish legal services or advice in this way. We think the principle which
underlies this provision applies equally to in individual who is not a lawyer,
and makes it equally improper for him to furnish legal services in this
manner.
3. The relation between attorney and counsel is of a personal and
fiduciary nature, and imposes obligations and responsibilities which cannot be
fully realized unless the attorney and counsel deal with each other directly.
4. The relation of the writer of a brief to the Court is one the dignity
and responsibility of which are inconsistent with the scheme proposed.
5. The offer by a third part-,, not an attorney, to furnish or sell the
legal services of members of the bar (in this case undisclosed), is derogatory
to the dignity and self-respect of the profession and would tend to lower
the standards of professional character and conduct.
QUESTION:
Mrs. 0. a client of A, an attorney, informs him that she deserted her
husband over three years ago. That her husband is living in the city of
- , state of - , and has resided there, she believes, for a considerable
period. That she is satisfied that she can never live with him again under
any circumstances.
She desires A, as her attorney, to see Mr. 0. to ask him if he will not
institute proceedings for a divorce against her in said state of -, in which
state she is informed he is entitled to a divorce on the ground of her deser-
tion, and of which state he has been a resident for a sufficiently long time.
Is A, in accepting the retainer, and having the interview with Mr. 0,
guilty of unprofessional conduct?
ANSWER:
In the opinion of the Committee, it is not unprofessional to accept such
a retainer, and there is no collusion or other impropriety in asking a hus-
band to enforce rights which have already accred. In view of the only too
numerous scandals connected with divorce litigation, however, the Com-
mittee believes that attorneys should be particularly careful in all such cases
to satisfy themselves that there has been no collusion in the prior conduct of
the parties.
